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Abstract  
 
The entanglement of border control technologies and immigration policies and 
practices with discourses of race, national identity and belonging has long been a 
focus of scholarly interest. In this paper we discuss the Human Provenance Pilot 
Project (HPPP), the aim of which was to evaluate the utility of genetic and isotope 
testing to corroborate asylum seekers’ accounts of their nationality. We subject the 
HPPP to a detailed socio-technical analysis, highlighting how technologies, practices 
and modes of thought travelled from the policing context to the asylum context, 
illuminating the unspoken prejudices that made that transfer possible, and reflecting 
on implications of the HPPP for academic research, policy advice and the asylum 
system.    
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Suspect Technologies: Forensic Testing of Asylum Seekers 
at the UK Border 
 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we examine the Human Provenance Pilot Project (HPPP) conducted in 
2009-10 by the UK Border Agency (UKBA). This project aimed to evaluate the utility of 
genetic and isotope testing to corroborate asylum seekers’ accounts of their 
nationality. When it gained public attention in September 2009, the HPPP was heavily 
criticised by leading scientists, journalists, and parliamentarians, who argued that the 
use of genetic and isotope tests to ascertain nationality was scientifically indefensible 
as well as ethically objectionable. In the face of this concerted criticism, the UKBA 
decided to suspend the HPPP before reinstating it as a shorter three-month study, 
rather than the twelve-month pilot as originally planned. Whereas initially the UKBA 
had intended to include the results of genetic ancestry and isotope analysis in the 
assessment of live asylum applications, in the new study such tests would now be 
conducted for research purposes only, and the results would be anonymized so that 
they would not impact on asylum decisions (UKBA 2009). The trial ended on 31 March 
2010. As late as October 2010, the UKBA was still promising to publish a review of the 
HPPP. However, in response to a Freedom of Information request by one of the 
authors (RT), the UKBA eventually stated that:  
Following the conclusion of the pilot, a decision was taken within the UK 
Border Agency not to take forward DNA/Isotope testing for country of origin 
identification purposes in the foreseeable future. On the basis of this decision, 
it was agreed that resources would not be devoted to carrying out an evaluation 
of the pilot at this point in time. If a decision to resume Familial DNA or 
Country of Origin testing is taken in the future, further consideration will be 
given to the scientific, legal and ethical basis on which it would operate. The 
Home Office would engage with relevant experts to address any concerns that 
may be raised regarding the use of this technique. (Martin 2011) 
 
The UKBA response also revealed that in the course of the HPPP, 198 familial 
relationship tests over 76 family groups were carried out, with 38 individuals tested as 
part of the ‘country of origin’ element (Martin 2011).  
One might be tempted to dismiss the HPPP as just another of the operational 
embarrassments that have dogged the UKBA since it was formed in 2008, and that led 
in March 2013 to the Home Secretary’s decision to abolish the Agency. However, the 
fact that the UKBA and Home Office persisted with the HPPP in spite of apparently 
devastating criticism from the scientific community, and did not rule out the 
possibility of reintroducing something similar in future, raises broader questions 
concerning public policy on the use of technology for border control. The UKBA’s 
interest in adopting new molecular technologies to test nationality claims comes at a 
time of more general change in the ideology and practice of border control in the UK 
 3 
and more widely. Researchers have pointed out how increasingly exclusionary 
immigration policies, and an increasingly close integration of immigration with 
criminal law, have tended towards de facto criminalisation of asylum seekers in both 
Europe and North America (Arat-Koc 1999, Miller 2003, Silveira Gorski 2008, Shuster 
2011). In the UK, official and popular attitudes to those who request sanctuary have 
become dominated by a hermeneutic of suspicion. Public and policy discourses 
portray asylum seekers as mostly ‘bogus’ refugees seeking admission to the country for 
economic, not humanitarian reasons. Seen in this context, the UKBA’s turn to genetic 
and isotope tests as a means of ascertaining nationality acquires a quite specific set of 
meanings, that tell us much about how the Agency and the Home Office regard 
asylum seekers.  
The entanglement of border control technologies and immigration policies and 
practices with discourses of race, national identity and belonging has long been a 
focus of scholarly interest (Fox et al. 2012). But the use of genetic and isotope tests 
adds further layers of prejudice and suspicion to the mix. For one thing, the 
technologies trialled in the HPPP originated in forensic practices of criminal 
investigation, from where they were imported directly into the work of border control. 
The HPPP thus represents a further expression of the more general inclination on the 
part of the UKBA to criminalise asylum applicants, in this case by subjecting them to 
biometric and other identification practices more usually employed in a criminal 
setting. Second, in the context of the HPPP, asylum seekers were accorded even fewer 
rights than would normally be granted to criminals. The effectiveness of genetic and 
isotope testing to determine place of origin has yet to be proven even in a criminal 
investigation context; its adoption into border control was thus purely experimental. 
Yet the UKBA decided to enrol vulnerable people as experimental subjects under 
conditions which effectively denied them the right to decide freely whether to submit 
to the tests. This is entirely contrary to the normal tenets of biomedical ethics, which 
apply to criminals as much as to other human subjects. Third, by adopting such 
technologies, the Border Agency sought to bypass asylum seekers’ testimonies of 
persecution and of why and how they came into the UK, replacing them with 
impersonal methods of assessing eligibility. This silencing only compounded the loss 
of identity, dignity and power of self-determination already suffered by refugees.   
The HPPP thus reveals a remarkable willingness on the part of the UKBA to treat 
asylum seekers as criminal suspects, suspend their basic human rights, subject them to 
unethical forms of human experimentation, and silence their personal narratives until 
chemical tests can prove them innocent of the presumption of lying and nationality 
fraud. In part, these problems may be obscured by the aura of objectivity that 
commonly attaches to new molecular technologies. In this paper, we therefore subject 
the HPPP to a detailed socio-technical analysis, highlighting how technologies, 
practices and modes of thought travelled from the policing context to the asylum 
context, illuminating the unspoken prejudices that made that transfer possible, and 
reflecting on the implications of the case of the HPPP for academic research, policy 
advice and the asylum system.    
The development of border control in the UK 
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In the wake of the terror attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, border controls of 
North American and European countries have been intensified in order to counter the 
threats from international terrorism. In 2007, the British Government reorganized its 
border control services and formed the UK Border Agency. This agency initiated a UK 
£1.2 billion ‘e-borders’ programme to accelerate adoption of biometric and other new 
technologies in order to further enhance border control. The British Government 
claimed that it was ‘delivering the biggest shake-up of border security and the 
immigration system in a generation’ (Cabinet Office 2009: 97). Nick Vaughan-
Williams (2010) argues that identity management has become central to how the 
British Government conceptualizes border control. In its 2007 White Paper on border 
control, the Government stated that ‘managing identity is fundamental’ to effective 
border security and that the aim of the UKBA is to ‘fix people’s identities at the earliest 
point practicable’ (Anon 2007).  
The UKBA’s announcement of the HPPP in September 2009 belongs in this context of 
increased investment in and technologization of border control. National identity has 
become vitally important in assessing whether someone claiming the right to asylum 
is a legitimate refugee or an economic migrant. Since at least the early 2000s, border 
agencies focused increasingly on the possibility that economic migrants might pose as 
citizens of particular countries in order to gain access to Britain as recognized 
refugees. Justifying its investment in the HPPP, the UKBA indicated that a ‘significant 
percentage of asylum applicants’ might be engaging in ‘nationality-swapping’, in 
particular applicants from the East African region. Kenyan nationals were allegedly 
seeking to pass themselves off as Somalis. The HPPP focused specifically on asylum 
applicants from that area to determine whether isotope and DNA analysis could help 
to ‘identify at the outset of the asylum process those who are claiming under a false 
nationality’ (UKBA 2009). 
Since the early 1990s, the legitimacy of those applying for asylum has been a hot 
political issue and a perennial interest of right-wing tabloid journalism using an 
aggressive derogatory rhetoric. Greenslade argues that the British tabloid press came 
increasingly to depict asylum seekers 
as a separate minority group. They have been made into scapegoats for a variety 
of society’s current ills [...] To this end, editors have sought to forge a unity of 
viewpoint between the indigenous white population and second and third 
generation Afro-Caribbean and Asian immigrants in opposition to asylum-
seekers, of whatever race or creed. (Greenslade, 2005: 6)  
In a context where immigration policy has become increasingly concerned with 
distinguishing ‘deserving’ from ‘undeserving’ migrants, the status of asylum seekers 
has become particularly fraught (Flynn 2005, Sales 2005).  There have been various 
well-publicized interventions to ‘crack down’ on ‘bogus asylum seekers’ by both 
Conservative and Labour administrations, whose measures have included reducing the 
benefits given to asylum applicants and a firmer approach to the detention and 
deportation of rejected applicants (Campbell, 2013). New policies were established 
including the detention of asylum applicants in detention centres if their claim is 
considered to be decided quickly. Meanwhile, as Zetter and Pearl observe: ‘Tighter 
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pre-entry deterrent measures have been matched, in-country, by a persecutory regime 
of welfare disentitlement and social exclusion for those who have managed to gain 
access [...] destitution amongst asylum seekers, as a result, has risen enormously since 
major legislative change in 1996’ (Zetter and Pearl 2000). Official statistics show that 
the number of asylum applications to Britain has declined significantly over the last 
ten years, due in part we might assume to the effectiveness of some of these 
interventions in projecting a view of Britain as inaccessible and inhospitable to 
refugees. However, the debate about ‘bogus asylum seekers’ has not lost force in 
public and policy discourses in a time of economic crisis and austerity. 
Seeking Asylum 
Along with other signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, 
Great Britain is bound to provide a system to assess asylum claims from individuals, 
without discrimination as to religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group. Britain is also a signatory to the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights and the European Union Asylum Qualification Directive, which also 
provides the legal basis on which individuals can make asylum claims. Yet the policies 
implemented by British and other European governments to restrict migration and 
asylum have altered the situation of migrants and refugees (Geddes 2003; Flynn 2005). 
Developments in EU immigration policy since the early 1990s have tended to limit the 
rights of refugees to enter the EU in order to seek asylum, and the policy that visa and 
entry documents should be applied for in the relevant embassy in the home country 
prior to travel, rather than upon arrival in the UK, places additional barriers in the way 
of those who face indifference, hostility or persecution from the authorities in their 
home country (Guild 2010). Asylum seekers are increasingly suspected of illegitimately 
claiming political persecution (Lynn and Lea 2003) and individuals in need of refuge 
face bureaucratic procedures that make it more difficult to leave one’s country and 
reach a safe destination.  
One result of bureaucratisation and the tightening of immigration rules in Europe has 
been to increase asylum seekers’ reliance on clandestine methods of entry (Schuster 
2011).  Those seeking asylum in Europe have become increasingly dependent on 
professional traffickers who are paid for providing transportation and often forged 
passports and identity documents. Traffickers are ‘experts’ on immigration policies, 
suitable travel routes and border control practice and often choose the country of 
arrival according to recent policy developments and practicalities. This leads to the 
separation of families or friendship networks. Asylum seekers report in interviews that 
they feel a lack of control about which country they go to and how. This weakens their 
confidence and their chances of integration into a new culture and society (Healey 
2006; Korac 2003). Moreover, under UK law, illegal entry into the country is now a 
criminal act. Consequently, use of the expertise and infrastructure provided by 
traffickers in order to arrive in a safe country further taints perceptions of migrants’ 
integrity (Koser 2000).  
In 2007, the Home Office introduced a new process for dealing with asylum claims, 
called the New Asylum Model whereby a UKBA staff member assumes the role of case 
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owner and is responsible for all the decisions taken on an asylum application until the 
person is granted or denied permission to stay. The case owner will conduct interviews 
with the applicant. A first interview aims to record details about how the applicant 
came to arrive in Britain and whether there was a relevant previous application for 
asylum either in Britain or another EU member state. A second interview, called the 
‘asylum interview’, follows in which the applicant has the opportunity to give an 
account of why she or he wishes to apply for asylum. The overwhelming majority of 
asylum applications are rejected at this stage. The applicant then has the right of 
appeal and to be heard by an independent immigration judge. As Anthony Good 
(2009) argues, the outcome of this process largely depends on the credibility of the 
applicant’s own testimony regarding her or his history and reasons for arrival in 
Britain to claim asylum:  
When presenting their claims, most asylum applicants cannot produce 
documentary corroboration of their ill-treatment, and certainly cannot call as 
witnesses those who have persecuted them. Asylum decisions are therefore 
heavily dependent upon assessments of the credibility of their accounts, 
presented to the Home Office and the courts mainly in the forms of asylum 
interview transcripts and witness statements. (Good 2009:1) 
In a context where it is increasingly assumed that a high proportion of applicants do 
not tell the truth about their reasons for seeking admission to the country, the process 
is heavily weighted towards finding reasons to doubt the applicant’s testimony and 
reject the application. 
Given the uncertainties involved in assessing asylum applicants’ testimony, for some 
time now the UKBA – along with border agencies in other countries – has sought 
other methods to inform decision making. A key method, in this respect, is the 
technique of language analysis. Since the early 2000s, the UKBA has sub-contracted 
commercial firms to analyse the speech of asylum applicants, with the aim of 
determining whether they actually come from the country they claim (Campbell, 
2013). Despite fundamental doubts about the validity of language analysis as a test of 
nationality, since 2008, language analysis has been applied several thousand times to 
asylum applicants, particularly those presenting as Somalian refugees (Campbell 2013). 
Language analysis can be seen as a ‘technology of identification’ aimed at establishing 
aspects of an applicant’s identity without relying on their personal testimony.  
Against this background, the HPPP is an attempt to develop and implement additional 
technologies of identification that aim to establish nationality independently of 
asylum applicants’ testimony and documentary evidence. The HPPP involved two such 
technologies: genetic testing for bio-geographical origins and isotope testing. These 
technologies were trialled specifically as an additional test to support language testing, 
which has been subject to legal challenge (Campbell 2013).  Genetic ancestry testing 
and isotope analysis were to be undertaken in cases where personal testimony and 
language analysis led UKBA officers to suspect that an individual who claimed to be 
from Somalia might actually be from another country. We now turn to discuss three 
particular areas of concern that arise from the HPPP which have wider implications.   
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Technological Border Crossings 
One important issue that the case of the HPPP highlights is the uncritical way in 
which technologies that had yet to establish their validity and utility in the context of 
forensic science and criminal investigation, were nonetheless adopted into the asylum 
context – initially, at least, on the assumption that they could be useful in evaluating 
‘live’ asylum applications. In this section, we focus on the background to how genetic 
ancestry testing and isotope testing came to be adopted by the leaders of the HPPP.  
We wish to emphasize how the genetic tests employed in the HPPP differ from other 
genetic technologies of identification. In the immigration context, DNA testing is 
regularly used to determine biological relationships between individuals. This well-
established and well-validated test involves looking at the degree of similarity between 
the DNA of two individuals to determine whether they are closely related, for instance 
as parent-child or siblings. Likewise, in forensic applications, routine DNA 
identification is based on simple matching of DNA profiles obtained from scene-of-
crime DNA traces with those from suspects. In contrast, the genetic tests for ancestry 
and geographical origins trialled in the HPPP were significantly more complex and 
tenuous.  
Genetic ancestry tests emerged in the late 1990s out of decades of basic research on 
population genetics. They utilize knowledge of how genetic variations arise through 
mutation and accumulate within more or less isolated populations, which thus come 
to embody distinctive combinations of gene variants. By analysing particular genetic 
variants present in an individual’s DNA, it may therefore be possible to infer, with a 
reasonable degree of probability, that certain of that individual’s ancestors were 
members of a particular bio-geographical population. However, there are very clear 
constraints on the precision and certainty with which such inferences can be drawn. 
The ability to trace ancestry to any particular population depends upon how precisely 
that population has been characterised in genetic terms: ancestry tracing is only as 
good as the genetic reference databases on which it draws. The construction of such 
databases is informed by prior assumptions about what counts as a population, and 
bio-geographic identities are thus inevitably coloured by ethnic/racial and geopolitical 
presuppositions. Moreover, because DNA variants are passed on through generations, 
it is difficult to infer just how recently an individual’s ancestors lived in a particular 
region. Consequently, a bio-geographic origin test may show that a particular 
individual has shared ancestors with members of a population that now lives 
predominantly in a particular location, but says little about that individual’s own 
recent place of residence, still less about her or his nationality. 
Despite these constraints, however, genetic testing for ancestry and geographical 
origins has come to be widely used, not just as a research tool by scientists interested 
in historical population movements, but also as a consumer service (Shriver and 
Kittles, 2004). One important market is among private users interested in tracing their 
recent genealogical and ancestral history. The idea that genetic testing can help to 
throw light on an individual’s ‘roots’ has been widely popularised in the media. The 
experiences of individuals who have undergone such testing to discover more about 
their family histories and geographical origins provide compelling stories of personal 
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identity and social history, and many such stories have featured in newspapers and 
magazine articles (Harmon 2007) and television programmes (such as Motherland: A 
Genetic Journey, broadcast February 2003 on BBC television: see BBC 2003). As a 
result, hundreds of thousands of consumers have bought genetic ancestry tests over 
the past ten years (Wolinsky, 2006: 1073).  
The marketing, uptake and effects of these tests have in turn been examined by social 
scientists. Some re-emphasise their scientific untrustworthiness, noting for instance 
that commercial genetic tests for bio-geographical origins often do not take account of 
the large population movements that have taken place across Africa in the past 200-
300 years, and urging that this may have implications for the truth of the origin and 
identity stories that consumers build around such tests (Royal et al., 2010, Lee et al., 
2009, Scully et al. 2013). Some suggest that such limitations are unimportant, since 
genetic ancestry testing is little more than a harmless recreational indulgence. Thus 
US bioethicist Henry Greely concludes that genetic genealogy is ‘interesting but 
arguably not very important ... genealogy .. [is] rarely of real significance’ (Greely, 
2008: 229). This has been very much the orthodox view: regulators and policy advisors 
have given little serious consideration to genetic ancestry testing, on the assumption 
that the ethical issues at stake are far less critical than those related to medical 
genetics (e.g. Human Genetics Commission 2003).  
However, a growing number of social scientists argue that, despite its scientific and 
technical limitations, the dissemination of genetic ancestry testing into popular 
culture has the potential to effect far-reaching changes in ideas of identity, belonging, 
history and race (Bolnick et al., 2007, Elliott and Brodwin, 2002, Skinner, 2006, Nelson, 
2008, Tutton, 2004, Nash, 2004). In particular, they point to instances where genetic 
ancestry testing is used not just for recreational purposes, but for the express purpose 
of identifying membership of particular socio-political groups. For instance, such 
testing has been employed by Native Americans in the US to determine tribal 
membership in ways that can exclude individuals who have traditionally been part of 
such tribes (Tallbear, 2008, Beckenhauer, 2003). In such cases, DNA testing is being 
used to redraw the boundaries around certain social and political identities, 
sometimes with profound implications for how individuals and groups think about 
themselves and for the life choices available to them. Meanwhile, forensic agencies 
have also taken an active interest in genetic ancestry tests as a possible means of 
identifying or eliminating suspects in criminal investigations. Notably, in Britain, the 
Forensic Science Service has looked into the geographical distribution of particular Y 
chromosome variants, and their association with particular surnames, as a means of 
using scene-of-crime samples to narrow down the range of likely suspects (Vince 
2006).  
While genetic ancestry testing concentrates on tracing the genes of ancestors in 
contemporary human bodies, isotope testing is based on the way that the different 
environments in which an individual lives may leave distinctive traces in her or his 
body. The proportions of different isotopes of various chemical elements present in 
the environment vary from one locality to another. These elements are ingested in 
food and drinking water and are incorporated, over time, into body tissues. 
Consequently, assuming that a person consumes local food, water and air, the 
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proportions of different isotopes present in her or his tissues will mirror those in the 
place where s/he lives. Moreover, because different tissues are laid down at different 
times in a person’s life, they embody a record of the person’s diet, and her or his 
movements over time. Adult teeth, for instance, are largely laid down between the 
ages of four and twenty, and may thus provide an indication of where a person lived as 
a child or young adult. Bone tissues, by contrast, are replaced over a period of several 
years, while hair and nails are replaced within a matter of months, so provide an 
indication of a person’s habitation or consumption within more recent time frames.  
It should be noted that, since both the number of naturally occurring isotopes and the 
range of possible variation is small, many different places in the world share similar 
isotope profiles. Consequently, isotope testing cannot be used to specify a unique 
location but may be useful as a way of eliminating options from a range of possible 
locations. These limitations are reflected in the way that archaeologists have used 
isotope testing to reconstruct the life course and migration of neolithic and early 
mediaeval individuals from well-preserved skeletons (Evans et al. 2006, Budd et al. 
2004): the confidence with which such reconstructions may be made is greatly aided 
by the fact that population movements at that time generally occurred over relatively 
small distances, thus reducing the range of possible places of origin, and that people 
consumed almost exclusively local food and water.  
By the early 2000s, isotope testing was also becoming incorporated into forensic 
techniques for tracing the origins of biological and chemical substances. Law 
enforcement agencies in North America and Europe formed networks with academic 
centres, forensic research laboratories and commercial laboratories to develop ways of 
applying isotope science to various aspects of law enforcement. Isotope analysis is now 
routinely used to authenticate the origins of certain imported foodstuffs such as 
honey. More importantly for security purposes, in 1999 the Forensic Explosives 
Laboratory (FEL) at Fort Halstead in Kent, England, was funded by the British Home 
Office to examine the utility of isotope ratios in the forensic analysis of explosives, 
with a view to tracing their movement through international terrorist networks 
(Doyle, 2002).  
Crucially for the story of the HPPP, genetic ancestry and isotope testing were used 
together for forensic purposes in the early 2000s in a rather unusual police 
investigation that became known as the Thames torso case. In September 2001, the 
Metropolitan Police began investigating a dismembered body of a young boy found in 
the river Thames in London. The unknown victim came to be known as ‘Adam’. 
Within a few months, the Police came to focus on the theory that Adam was the 
victim of a ritualistic killing, which the British media repeatedly reported as an 
‘African ritual murder’ (Sanders, 2003: 58). Although a number of Africanist 
anthropologists consulted by the Metropolitan Police contested this framing of what 
happened to the boy, arguing a lack of evidence to support this account, the detectives 
pursued this line of inquiry (Ranger, 2007, Sanders, 2003). As well as visiting Nigeria 
and South Africa, they employed the services of population geneticists and 
geochemists to help them determine the boy's ancestry and place of origin. 
Mitochondrial DNA analysis indicated that he was probably of West African origin, 
while analysis of the strontium isotopes in his bones was consistent with him having 
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grown up in a ‘small area in north-west Africa, probably a rural area near the city of 
Benin in south-western Nigeria’ (in Ranger 2007: 272). As a result of a witness coming 
forward, police now believe they have identified the boy and have spoken to relatives 
still living in Nigeria (Quinn, 2011). Though the perpetrators have never been found, 
the case generated considerable media interest and much of the original investigation 
was documented by a film crew and shown on British television. 
A direct link can be drawn between this case and the HPPP. The detective in charge of 
the Thames torso investigation was Detective Inspector Will O’Reilly. He is credited 
with being responsible both for proposing the HPPP and for securing its funding from 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) under its Returns and 
Reintegration Fund, with ‘full Ministerial support’ (Douglas, 2009). On retiring from 
the Metropolitan Police he became the project manager of the HPPP, and – or so it is 
claimed- went on to assist in the construction of ‘isotopic and ancestral DNA 
databases for the forensic use of law enforcement agencies worldwide’ (Anon 2012). It 
would appear that the HPPP was directly inspired by O’Reilly’s experience of using 
these new and still relatively untested technologies of identification in the Adam torso 
case. We now consider whether these new technologies can appropriately be 
transferred to the assessment of asylum applications..  
Substituting Biology for Nationality  
 
Recent years have seen a massive intensification in the use of new technologies of 
identity – including biometrics and networked information technology as well as 
language analysis – not just for evaluating the credibility of asylum applicants, but for 
routine purposes of border control. Such technologies are concerned with identity, not 
as experienced by individuals, but as assigned by impersonal, suspicious and often 
hostile agencies. As Louise Amoore (2011) has argued, they diminish the agency of all 
who cross international borders, by depriving them of their right to tell their own 
stories (see also Feldman 2012). The use of biometric and linguistic technologies shifts 
the evidence from the applicant’s personal narrative of persecution to seemingly 
objective means of assessing certain aspects of identity. However, such technologies of 
identity do not simply offer more objective means of confirming or disconfirming 
conventional identity claims. They actually redefine the social categories of identity on 
which immigration and asylum decisions are based. Thus, genetic family relationship 
testing replaces the social category of kinship with the biological category of genetic 
relatedness; as other observers have noted, since biological relatedness does not 
necessarily map onto kinship, for instance where children are adopted, this may do 
violence to family relationships and cause renewed distress to those seeking asylum 
(Heinemann & Lemke 2012). The HPPP went even further in seeking to employ 
biological categories of ancestry and life history as a proxy for the social category of 
nationality. Criticism of the HPPP has focused primarily on the viability of this 
substitution.   
 
With regard to isotope testing, critics pointed out that archaeologists and forensic 
investigators are typically able to base their inferences about individuals’ origins and 
movements on measurements from a range of tissues, including teeth and bone as 
well as hair and fingernails. By contrast, UKBA officials plainly could not expect to 
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take tooth or bone samples from asylum applicants, so were limited to observations of 
hair and fingernails, which only provide information about an applicant’s likely diet 
over the previous six months to a year. This placed very severe limits on what can be 
inferred from such measurements. Asylum applicants often spend protracted periods 
away from their home country before arriving at their country of destination. Many 
Somali refugees, for instance, spend years in refugee camps outside their home 
country, while those who resort to human trafficking networks may spend long 
periods being moved from one place to another before being delivered to Britain. Even 
where individuals come directly to Britain from their home country, their diet in the 
previous months could often be heavily supplemented with imported food, 
particularly in countries such as Somalia that receive significant quantities of food aid. 
All of these factors will mean that the isotopes present in asylum applicants’ hair and 
nails may bear little relationship to those found in their home country. In 
consequence, it is difficult to see how isotope analysis could provide meaningful 
information about the origins of asylum applicants subjected to the HPPP. It might, 
however, provide evidence consistent with an individual having recently spent time in 
another country outside their country of origin – which the UKBA typically sees as 
sufficient reason to reject an asylum application, since it assumes the applicant can 
safely be returned to that other country.  
Moreover, the use of isotope testing to indicate whether a person’s biological make-up 
is consistent with them having spent time in a particular region depends on having 
sufficiently detailed information about the distribution of the relevant environmental 
isotopes across that region. Such data as exist for Somalia are very sketchy, while the 
situation there makes it unlikely that accurate mapping will be undertaken in the 
foreseeable future. Similar objections have been made to the use of genetic ancestry 
testing under the HPPP. Critics pointed out that there is little detailed information 
about the genetics of Somali populations; the present political situation effectively 
prohibits the kind of research that would be necessary to generate such information. 
Even if such research were possible, significant and often chaotic population 
movements prompted by the political situation would likely render the resulting data 
unreliable in a relatively short time. The UKBA sought to get around these problems 
by compiling information on the genetics of various Kenyan populations, on the 
grounds that the majority of ‘bogus’ Somali asylum seekers were thought to come from 
Kenya – but without proper knowledge of the genetic similarities, differences and 
overlaps between Kenyan and Somali populations, such information was useless.  
This leads to another, even more fundamental issue, namely that biological 
information about population genetics or environmental circumstances has no 
necessary relationship to the social categories of national identity and citizenship. As 
the journal Nature puts it: “the idea that genetic variability follows man-made national 
boundaries is absurd” (Nature 2009). Exactly the same point can be made about 
language analysis (Campbell 2013). On the one hand, national borders have often been 
drawn in ways that cut across existing population groupings – as for instance in 
Eastern Africa, where ethnic Somalis are found on both sides of the border that divides 
Somalia from Kenya. On the other hand, national borders rarely represent a complete 
barrier to human migration and relations, and such migrations may be especially large 
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in war-torn areas like the Horn of Africa. In sum, genetic testing, and information 
about probable place of residence provide no guide to nationality.  
Asylum Seekers as Experimental Subjects 
If the use of genetic and isotope tests as proxies for nationality was scientifically 
dubious, the trialling of such tests in live asylum cases was ethically indefensible. 
Normally, the use of genetic technologies of investigation and identity is heavily 
circumscribed by ethical safeguards to protect privacy and individual integrity; and 
this is particularly the case when those technologies are unproven, and are being 
employed purely for research purposes. We might expect that such safeguards would 
be applied with especial rigour when dealing with vulnerable individuals in a crisis 
situation. However, while the UKBA did gesture in the direction of research ethics 
procedures, those procedures were far too weak to provide genuine protection to the 
individual asylum applicants who passed through the HPPP. The Agency specified that 
individuals whom officials wanted to subject to genetic ancestry and isotope testing 
should be told about the tests, given the option of refusing consent, and assured that 
refusal would not prejudice the outcome of their asylum application – a procedure 
that they regarded as ‘informed consent’. However, applicants were also to be told that 
a refusal would be recorded, and would be made known to the UKBA officers and 
appeal judges responsible for the final decision (UKBA 2009). Under such 
circumstances, it is unlikely that an applicant would be reassured that a refusal would 
not influence assessment. The procedures fell far short of ethical expectations which 
include free and informed consent to a genetic test; for vulnerable individuals anxious 
to satisfy the demands of an inhospitable asylum system, the pressure to give consent 
must have been considerable.  
This de facto suspension of normal research ethics procedures is all the more striking 
when we realise that there was no good reason why research into isotope and genetic 
ancestry testing need even have been conducted on actual asylum applicants. The 
declared purpose of the trial was to assess whether such tests were effective in 
determining the real country of origin of asylum applicants claiming to come from 
Somalia. But that purpose could equally well have been met by looking not at 
individuals who were currently seeking asylum, but at those who had already been 
granted it. Indeed, such a trial would arguably have been more scientifically 
conclusive, since the fact that the subjects had already satisfied the normal asylum 
requirements would effectively serve as a control for the effectiveness of the 
technologies being evaluated. It would also have been more ethically sound, since 
those tested, having already been granted asylum, might be seen as having less to lose 
from refusing to participate in the experiment.  
In fact, the UKBA appears to have given little thought to such ethical issues when 
designing the HPPP. Rather, it seems to have taken it for granted that asylum 
applicants are legitimate subjects of investigation, whose special vulnerabilities can 
effectively be ignored. If anything, the turn to genetic ancestry testing and isotope 
analysis, like the adoption of language analysis, serves to exploit and compound those 
vulnerabilities by diminishing asylum applicants’ agency in the process of legitimising 
their own case for asylum. Applicants’ ability to tell their own story about their 
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personal experiences of threat and persecution, as understood by the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, becomes secondary to tests administered and controlled by border 
agencies. This only adds to the loss of agency and control that they already suffer, not 
only as a result of having to flee their home country, but also, in many cases, from 
having to place themselves in the hands of human traffickers, with all that may entail 
in terms of being given a false identity and entering a world of dubious legality 
(Healey 2006; Koser 2000). For those fleeing persecution in their own country, that 
deprivation may entail incalculable risks to health, life, and social status, while 
rejection of their application and repatriation to their country of origin could lead to 
imprisonment, injury or even death.  
Conclusion 
In this article we have discussed a widely criticized pilot project which the UKBA 
undertook in 2010 to trial the use of genetic ancestry and isotope testing in asylum 
application cases. While the UKBA states that it has no plans to develop these 
techniques in the ‘foreseeable future’, the possibility remains that its successor agency 
or another immigration agency in another country may take up such technologies at a 
future time.  
We argue that the HPPP was indicative of a broader set of trends by which 
technologies, practices, and modes of thought from the context of criminal 
investigation have come to shape the asylum system. The sociologists Robin Williams 
and Paul Johnson have argued persuasively that the establishment and use by UK 
police of the forensic National DNA Database should be seen as part of a larger 
paradigm shift in policing: from a criminal justice paradigm, premised on a concern to 
deliver justice equally to all citizens, to a crime management paradigm, concerned 
rather with identifying and managing what is taken to be an inherently criminal 
element within society (Williams and Johnson 2008). According to Williams and 
Johnson, the routine use of technologies of identity like the National DNA Database 
has been a vital element in realising the crime management paradigm, by providing an 
effective means of both identifying and incriminating that criminal element.  
By the same token, we might see the HPPP as part of a similar shift in asylum 
procedures: from a humanitarian paradigm motivated by a concern to provide shelter 
for the victims of human rights abuses, to a border control paradigm concerned with 
restricting the movement of suspicious would-be immigrants. In the border control 
case as in the crime management case, new technologies of identification were 
adopted as a means of identifying and excluding suspect individuals from the 
privileges of life in respectable society. Indeed, the UKBA even anticipated that the 
results of the HPPP would eventually be evaluated by the Forensic Science Regulator, 
who is normally responsible for ensuring that forensic services meet appropriate 
standards of scientific quality (Vorhaus 2009). Given all this, the HPPP looked very 
much like a further step towards the de facto criminalisation of asylum applicants. In 
this respect, it is notable that, faced with concerted criticism of the scientific viability 
of the HPPP, the UKBA was moved to declare that it had at least proved to be an 
effective deterrent, as measured by a significant reduction in the number of asylum 
claims during the time it was in operation. In this presumption of guilt, as in the 
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decision to subject vulnerable individuals to unethical research practices, the HPPP 
actually went rather further in dismissing the rights of individuals than would 
normally be permissible when dealing with criminal suspects.   
The priorities behind the introduction of the HPPP are evident: it was motivated at 
least as much by a desire to exclude asylum seekers as by any concern to provide 
refuge to those in legitimate need. And while the HPPP may have failed to validate 
dubious scientific practices of border control, the political impetus behind its 
introduction persists. As such, the HPPP stands as a salutary warning of the ways in 
which supposedly objective technologies of identification are increasingly being used 
at international borders as a way of further disempowering the already vulnerable. 
While the UKBA has decided, at least for the time being, against using genetic 
ancestry testing and isotope analysis, the HPPP nonetheless raises a number of serious 
issues that we have detailed in this paper.  
While some of the response from the scientific community showed a sense of surprise 
and indignation, against the background of the developments we have outlined above, 
the HPPP should perhaps not have been so unexpected. It highlights that policy 
advisors and social scientists need to be alert to the many ways in which new 
technologies – especially in the field of genetics – might be taken up. While 
bioethicists and social scientists have sometimes been criticised for getting ahead of 
the research, anticipating or speculating about social effects which may never happen, 
the HPPP actually shows that ethical and political vigilance - informed by just such 
sociotechnical anticipation - is important if such abuses are to be avoided. Wider 
public discussion and solid reflection in advance might have prevented the initiation 
of the HPPP in the first place.   
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